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I. INTRODUCTION
Some articles focus on big issues, such as the proper purposes of
sentencing, the debate between determinate and indeterminate
sentencing, or the optimal allocation of authority between prosecutors
and judges. This piece, written for the Wayne Law Review Symposium
on white collar sentencing, tackles a concededly narrower topic: the
"sophisticated means" enhancement for fraud offenses under Section
2BI.I(b)(10)(C) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG).'
Over the past decade, the rate at which courts impose this enhancement
in federal fraud cases has more than tripled, from approximately 2.9% of
all fraud cases in 2005 to over 11% in 2013.2
t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
The author thanks Professor Peter Henning and the staff of the Wayne Law
Review for organizing this Symposium.
1. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.l(b)(10) (2014). The Sentencing
Commission recently voted to amend parts of this Guideline. See infra Part IV and notes
115-116.
2. See infra Table 1. This includes not only the application of the enhancement
under Section 2B 1.1, but also under the fraud guideline's predecessor, Section 2F1.1. The
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Although the enhancement's effect on sentences is modest,
amounting to an increase of 6-12 months' imprisonment for most
defendants, its increasing prevalence ought to inspire interest among
those tasked with mediating limited enforcement budgets and prison
space. Moreover, this case study is particularly timely in light of the
Sentencing Commission's recent attempt to reform the primary guideline
under which economic offenders are sentenced.4  Indeed, the
enhancement growth demonstrates the ways in which .various sorting
measures can gradually lose their ability to distinguish the worst
offenders from the merely bad.
This Essay begins by briefly discussing the two-point enhancement
for frauds that "involve[] sophisticated means."5 It then demonstrates,
using the Sentencing Commission's own data, the steady increase in the
number of fraud sentences that include the enhancement.6 After
considering several justifications for the enhancement,7 the Essay offers
three possible explanations for this increase. 8 They include: (a) the
criminal population has become more sophisticated since the
Sentencing Commission's data did not begin breaking out data for this particular
enhancement until 2005.
3. The United States Sentencing Commission (Commission or Sentencing
Commission) has highlighted its intention "to consider the issue of reducing costs of
incarceration and overcapacity of prisons, to the extent it is relevant to any identified
priority." Proposed Priorities for Amendment Cycle, 79 Fed. Reg. 31409-01 (proposed
June 2, 2014).
4. The Commission has been engaged in a multi-year study of Section 2B 1.1. See
Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 78 Fed. Reg. 51820 (Aug. 21, 2013); see
also Final Priorities for Amendment Cycle, 79 Fed. Reg. 49378 (Aug. 20, 2014). As part
of its study, the Commission conducted a symposium in New York City on September
18-19, 2013, to discuss possible changes to Section 2B1.I. Transcripts and other
materials related to the Symposium are available. See United States Sentencing
Commission Symposium on Economic Crime, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION,
http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/economic-
crimes/united-states-sentencing-commissionsymposium-economic-crime (last visited
May 25, 2015).
5. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Bl.l(b)(10) (2014). The manual
provides in pertinent part: "If (A) the defendant relocated, or participated in relocating, a
fraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement or regulatory
officials; (B) a substantial part of a fraudulent scheme was committed from outside the
United States; or (C) the offense otherwise involved sophisticated means, increase by 2
levels." Id. The Sentencing Commission has proposed an amendment that would narrow
the enhancement's application to the defendant whose specific conduct involves
sophisticated means. For discussion on this, see infra Part V and notes 115-116.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.A.
8. See infra Part IV.B.
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enhancement enactment; 9 (b) federal prosecutors have charged more
sophisticated fraud crimes as a percentage of their overall docket;'I and
(c) courts, probation officers and prosecutors all have gradually widened
their definition of what counts as sophisticated, thereby creating a type of
sentencing creep," wherein the enhancement no longer performs the
guideline's intended function of distinguishing more serious offenses
from lesser ones.12
The final section of this Essay addresses the policy implications of
the foregoing discussion.' 3 Enhancements such as those found in Section
2B 1.1 are intended to guide federal judges in separating out merely bad
behavior from much worse behavior.' 4 If the Commission meant the
sophisticated means enhancement to cull the most dangerous or most
morally culpable fraud offenders from the rest of the herd, it may need to
find different language to say so. Left intact, the enhancement is likely to
become nearly as ubiquitous-and criticized-as its predecessor, the
"more than minimal planning" enhancement.
II. THE 2001 FRAUD GUIDELINE REVISION AND THE SOPHISTICATED
MEANS ENHANCEMENT
In 2001, after five years of receiving substantial input from
numerous federal criminal justice constituencies, the Sentencing
Commission overhauled the economic crime guidelines that pertained to
fraud and theft offenses.' 5 Sections 2F1.1 and 2B1.1, which previously
9. See infra Part IV.B. 1.
10. See infra Part IV.B.2.
11. Mission creep is a social science term describing the ways in which regulators
gradually stray beyond their agency's prescribed mission. The term sentencing creep
applies the general concept of mission creep to the sentencing context. For one author's
recent critique of sentence creep at the state level, see Anne Yantus, Sentence Creep:
Increasing Penalties in Michigan and the Need for Sentencing Reform, 47 U. MiCH. J.L.
REFORM 645 (2014).
12. See infra Part IV.B.3.
13. See infra Part V.
14. The Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 245 (2005). Trial courts must impose a sentence in accordance with the general
purposes of punishment laid out in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (a) (West 2014). Although
sentences may still be reviewed on appeal for "reasonableness," a sentence that applies
the Guidelines and sentences the defendant within its recommended sentencing range is
presumptively reasonable on appeal. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007).
15. For an excellent overview of the dynamics underlying the 2001 Economic Crime
Package and the resulting Guidelines that were enacted, as well as the dynamics that led
to further changes following passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see Frank 0. Bowman,
III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms: An Analysis and Legislative
History, 35 IND. L. REv. 5, 38-47 (2001) [hereinafter Bowman, The 2001 Federal
20151
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had separately addressed fraud and theft offenses respectively, were
consolidated into a single guideline, Section 2B 1.1.16 The "new" Section
2Bl.1 featured a revised loss table that imposed higher penalties on
offenses that involved high loss amounts and lower penalties for offenses
that involved very low loss amounts. 17
Notably, the Commission deleted from the consolidated guideline an
enhancement that had previously applied to offenses involving "more
than minimal planning" (MMP), in part because the enhancement had
become so common. 18 As a result, the MMP enhancement no longer
divided the "really sophisticated schemers from the mass of ordinary
thieves."' 9  The revised and consolidated guideline effectively
incorporated MMP into the revised fraud loss table; its elimination
therefore was neither intended nor perceived as a reduction in sentence
for most fraud offenders.2°
At the same time the Commission did away with MMP, it
highlighted the "sophisticated means" enhancement, which had been
added to the fraud guideline back in 1998, pursuant to Congress's
directive in the Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act.21 The enhancement,
which mirrored a similar enhancement already contained in the tax fraud
guideline, Section 2Tl.1, increased an offender's offense level by two
whenever it appeared that the offense involved sophisticated means in
Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms] and Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager Les
Autres? The Curious History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, I
OHIO ST. CRIM. L.J. 373, 387-91 (2004) [hereinafter Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments].
16. Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments, supra
note 15, at 388.
17. Id. at 389.
18. Id. at 407; see also John Steer, The Sentencing Commission's Implementation of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 263, 264 (2003) (explaining that MMP had
become "routinely applicable in nearly all fraud offenses" and "produced an inordinate
amount of litigation in both the sentencing and appellate courts").
19. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Coping with "Loss": A Re-Examination of Sentencing
Federal Economic Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REv. 461, 499 (1998)
[hereinafter Bowman, Coping with "Loss "].
20. United States v. Forchette, 220 F. Supp. 2d 914, 917-18 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (citing
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (supp. 2001) (amendment 617)) ("[T]he
enhancement has not really been abolished. Rather, in recognition of the fact that it was
applied in more than eighty percent of fraud cases, the Commission simply incorporated
it into the § 2B 1. 1 loss table, obviating the need for judicial fact-finding and avoiding the
potential overlap with the 'use of sophisticated means' enhancement.").
21. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (Supp. 1998), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-
manual/1998/manual/APPCSUPP.pdf.
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either the execution or concealment of the offense.2 2 The enhancement
also set a floor of twelve offense levels for any offense (even a very low-
loss offense) meeting the definition of sophisticated.23
A close reading of the enhancement suggests that the Commission
originally intended it to function as a catch-all, the third of three
enhancements aimed at complex, or difficult to detect, conduct.
Specifically, the Guideline provides: "If (A) the defendant relocated, or
participated in relocating, a fraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction to
evade law enforcement or regulatory officials; (B) a substantial part of a
fraudulent scheme was committed from outside the United States; or (C)
the offense otherwise involved sophisticated means .. .."24The
placement of the sophisticated means enhancement at the end of this list
is notable. The first two enhancements describe a narrow set of offenses:
offenses in which the offender purposely "relocated" the scheme to
evade law enforcement, and extraterritorial offenses, whose presence in
foreign countries uniformly posed difficulties for enforcement authorities
and therefore, by definition involved "a particularly high level of...
complexity. 25
But what of those cases that were neither extraterritorial, nor
purposely relocated in order to evade authorities? What is a fraud offense
that "otherwise involve[s]" sophisticated means? 26 A jurist might
conclude that whatever falls within this group, it must be an offense at
least as complex, with an offender as difficult to apprehend, as either the
extraterritorial or multijurisdictional offenses that qualify for similar
enhancements.2 7 But the Guidelines' own "Application Note" following
22. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2Tl.l(b)(2) (2014). The
Commission first suggested an enhancement for "sophisticated concealment," (see
Amendment 576), but later broadened the enhancement's language to "sophisticated
means" to adhere to Congress' directive in the Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act of
1998. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Tl.l(b)(2) app. C (supp. 1998),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-
manual/] 998/manual/APPCSUPP.pdf.
23. See id. § 2T1.l(b).
24. Id. § 2B1.1(10) (2014) (emphasis added).
25. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.1 cmt. background (2012).
26. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1. 1(10) (2014).
27. Such an approach would reflect the interpretive canon known as ejusdem generis.
"[W]hen a statute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general term, that
general term is confined to covering subjects comparable to the specifics it follows." Hall
St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008); see also Victoria's Secret
Direct, LLC v. United States, 769 F.3d 1102, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Avenues
Leather, Inc. v. United States, 178 F.3d 1241, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (general phrase at
end of list ought to reflect "same essential characteristics or purposes that unite the listed
examples preceding the general term or phrase.").
20151
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Section 2B1.1 appears to reject this familiar interpretive approach.28
Although the Note initially states that the enhancement applies to
"especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct,"29 it goes on
to provide examples that promote a far broader application of the term.
For example, in a telemarketing scheme, locating the main office
of the scheme in one jurisdiction but locating soliciting operations in
another jurisdiction ordinarily indicates sophisticated means.
Conduct such as hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the
use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial
accounts also ordinarily indicates sophisticated means.
30
Now, perhaps locating "the main office" of a fraudulent scheme in
one state and carrying out the rest in another appeared particularly
complicated back in 1998, when telemarketing schemes were salient and
on both the legislature's and Commission's minds. Neither cell phones
nor portable computers were as accessible or powerful as they are today,
and perhaps the movement of assets through more than one bank account
evinced particular sophistication and cunning back in the day. The use of
multiple shells or fictitious entities might well have confused even
veteran investigators and thereby delayed detection of certain frauds.
As the Supreme Court itself recently recognized, however,
technology-particularly technology relating to the ways in which we
use computers, the Internet, and telephones-has dramatically
transformed the ways in which we conduct our personal and commercial
business.3' As a result, mere amateurs can easily undertake the conduct
that society previously deemed so "sophisticated."
Today, setting up a virtual office in multiple states would require no
more than a few clicks on the Internet;32 opening one or several bank
accounts online would be, in the words of one financial institution "fast,
28. SeeU.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2BI. 1 cmt. n.9(B).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) ("Prior to the digital age, people
did not typically carry a cache of sensitive personal information with them as they went
about their day. Now it is the person who is not carrying a cell phone, with all that it
contains, who is the exception.").
32. See United States v. Brown, No. CIV. WMN-14-224, 2015 WL 1622034, at *1
(D. Md. Apr. 8, 2015) (describing a scheme in which the defendant "falsely held out that
his companies had offices in several cities and abroad, when in fact, he was using virtual
offices, telephone answering services, and mail forwarding services to mimic multiple
offices").
[Vol. 6 1:1
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easy, and secure"; 33 and incorporating one or more entities as a
corporation or limited liability company would not only be easy, but also
fairly inexpensive, as numerous incorporation businesses now market
their assistance over the web.34 If sophistication is an absolute concept,
linked to the usage of or interaction with multiple locations, accounts and
corporate entities, then it is fair to say that a substantial number of those
defendants who have transgressed one of the many federal fraud statutes
have in fact used "sophisticated means." Indeed, the very concept of
geographical boundaries embedded in the enhancement no longer makes
sense. Perhaps some schemes really are "located" in New York or New
Jersey or some foreign country; many others, however, are-and will
increasingly continue to be-located primarily in some amorphous,
virtual computing cloud.35
To put it mildly, during the past decade, the enhancement's
Application Note has become obsolete. In the meantime, the
enhancement's prevalence has steadily increased, as discussed in Part III
below.
III. THE ENHANCEMENT'S GROWING POPULARITY: 2005-13
Over the past decade, the sophisticated means enhancement has
become more prevalent. Consider Table 1 below, which aggregates the
data found on the Commission's website. 36 Between 2005 and 2013, over
33. See, e.g., Open a SunTrust Account, SUNTRUST,
https://www.suntrust.com/OpenAccount (last visited May 25, 2015); see also CIn.coM
https://online.citibank.com/US/JRS/pands/detail.do?ID=AOProductSelection (last visited
May 25, 2015) (advising customers to "apply now" "[w]ithout moving a muscle");
FAQs: Applying for Bank Accounts, BANK OF AMERICA,
https://www.bankofamerica.com/deposits/manage/faq-applying-for-accounts.go (last
visited May 25, 2015) (advising that customers may apply online for a checking, savings,
CD or IRA account).
34. See, e.g., COMPANY CORP., https://www.incorporate.com (last visited May 25,
2015) (incorporation site advertising "fast, simple" incorporations); Michael Simkovic &
Benjamin S. Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, The Problem of Hindsight
Bias, and the Credit Default Swap Solution, 2011 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 118, 123 n.7
(2011) (citing rise of online and do-it-yourself incorporation sites that provide services
for less than $200).
35. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 ("Cloud computing is the capacity of Internet-connected
devices to display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself.").
36. The information discussed in this Section was extracted from the Guideline
Application Frequencies tab, found on the Sentencing Commission's website. Guideline
Application Frequencies, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-
publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/guideline-application-frequencies 
-(last visited
May 25, 2015). The Commission provides a frequency analysis for each fiscal year from
2013 through 2002. The Commission began reporting the "sophisticated means"
enhancement contained in Sections 2B 1.1 (b)(10)(C) and 2FI.1 (b)(6)(C) separately from
20151
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70,000 individuals were prosecuted and sentenced for fraud-related
offenses.37 Most of those individuals were sentenced under Section
2B 1.1; some, whose crimes occurred prior to the overhaul of the
economic Guidelines, were sentenced under Section 2F1.1, which
contained its own identical "sophisticated means" enhancement.
38
Over a nine-year period, the percentage of fraud defendants who
have received a sophisticated means enhancement under either Sections
2B 1.1 or 2F 1.1 has more than tripled:
other enhancements (relocating the crime to a different jurisdiction and committing a
substantial portion of the scheme from outside United States) in 2005. Id.
37. See generally Guideline Application Frequencies, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/guideline-
application-frequencies (last visited May 25, 2015).
38. Although a court ordinarily applies the Guidelines Manual in effect as of the date
of sentencing, the court should apply an earlier manual if application of the new manual
results in an ex post facto problem. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 1B1.l l(b)(1) (2012). Accordingly, even after the enactment of Section 2BI. in 2001, a
number of defendants continued to seek sentencing under the previous Guidelines
Manuals, which sentenced fraud under Section 2Fl.1. Each Guideline contains an
identical enhancement for frauds involving "sophisticated means." See generally
Guideline Application Frequencies, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/guideline-
application-frequencies (last visited May 25, 2015).
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Table 1: Sophisticated Means from 2005-13
Year Fraud Offender Percentag Percentag
Offenders s Receiving e of Offenders e of Offenders
Sentenced Enhancement Receiving Receiving
under under 2B 1.1 Enhancement Enhancement
2B1.l and or2Fl.1 under Section under 2Bl
2Fl.139  2Bl.1 or 2Fl.1 40
2005 8060 232 2.9% 2.9%
2006 8089 302 3.6% 3.7%
2007 7777 387 4.3% 5.0%
2008 8370 420 4.7% 5.0%
2009 8058 507 6.2% 6.3%
2010 8427 601 7.1% 7.1%
2011 8561 813 9.4% 9.5%
2012 8748 837 9.6% 9.6%
2013 8416 982 11.7% 11.7%
Total 74506 5081
Back in 2005, a tiny fraction of fraud offenders received the two-
point enhancement under either §2Bl.1 or §2F1.1.41 Today, over 10%
do,42 and that number appears poised to grow in light of the manner in
which courts routinely interpret the enhancement.
Over the years, a number of federal courts have held that the
sophisticated means enhancement is warranted for conduct that is
"repetitive" and "coordinated, ' ' 3 that extends over a certain period of
time," that includes the use of pseudonyms, forgeries, or fake invoices,45
39. These figures were calculated by adding the total number of defendants
sentenced under Sections 2B.lI and 2FI.l as reported in the Sentencing Commission's
Use of Guidelines and Specific Offense Characteristics: Fiscal Year, for each year from
2005-2013. Each of these reports can be found at the Guideline Frequencies tab on the
Commission's website for each of these years, the "fiscal year" report was used.
Guideline Application Frequencies, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/guideline-
application-frequencies (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
40. These figures were calculated by adding the total number of defendants
sentenced under both 2B 1.1 and 2F I. I for the respective year to obtain a denominator,
and then adding the total number of defendants receiving "sophisticated means"
enhancements under either Guideline enhancement to obtain a numerator. Id.
41. See Guideline Application Frequencies, supra note 37.
42. Id.
43. United States v. Bane, 720 F.3d 818, 826-27 (11 th Cir. 2013) (relaying how
defendant coordinated complex series of acts to accomplish health care fraud scheme).
44. United States v. Bistrup, 449 F.3d 873, 883 (8th Cir. 2006).
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or that employs several bank accounts (often in someone else's name) to
carry out the offense.46 Sophisticated schemes need not be "brilliant" or
even "intelligent," so long as they exhibit greater complexity than so-
called ordinary frauds.47 As the Eighth Circuit recently observed
(apparently without irony): "'Sophisticated means' need not be highly
sophisticated. 48 To prove that the enhancement truly has come full
circle, one court has helpfully explained that the enhancement's
application "is proper when the conduct shows a greater level of
planning or concealment than a typical fraud of its kind."'49 Thus, the
very enhancement that was intended to replace "more than minimal
planning" now appears to apply to anything requiring "more than usual
planning."
Some of the enhancement's growth may be attributable to the
interpretive approach that many courts adopt. Because courts often
evaluate the offender's scheme "viewed as a whole," for sophistication, 50
prosecutors have every reason to cite every aspect of the fraud, including
even relatively simplistic behavior. By the same token, otherwise
ordinary schemes can attain sophistication primarily because of their
duration. Over time, the factors cited by the court upholding the
enhancement in case "A" create fodder for the enhancement's
application in case "B," which features a slightly different panoply of
actions that holistically demonstrates the defendant's sophistication.
45. United States v. Crosgrove, 637 F.3d 646, 667 (6th Cir. 2011) (enhancement
appropriate for defendant who used pseudonym and issued fraudulent insurance
certificates); United States v. Miell, 744 F. Supp. 2d 904, 941 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (opining
that "the use of forged signatures and falsified or altered documents to support the fraud
is sufficient, standing alone" to support a sophisticated means enhancement).
46. See United States v. Horob, 735 F.3d 866, 872 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing the
defendant's use of multiple bank accounts and forged documents, as well as the fact that
the defendant "manipulated several people to lie for him"); United States v. Clarke, 562
F.3d 1158, 1166 (11 th Cir. 2009) (contending that there exists "no material difference
between concealing income and transactions through the use of third-party accounts ...
and using a corporate shell or a fictitious entity to hide assets.").
47. "This argument confuses 'sophisticated' for 'intelligent."' United States v. Fife,
471 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the defendant's argument that a "dumb"
scheme did not qualify for enhancement in tax fraud case).
48. United States v. Norwood, 774 F.3d 476, 480 (8th Cir. 2014).
49. United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 315 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v.
Landwer, 640 F.3d 769, 771 (7th Cir. 2011)) (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Mahmud, 541 F. App'x 630, 636 (6th Cir. 2013)
("[E]ven though none of its component parts was especially intricate standing alone, the
scheme as a whole was complex."); United States v. Jenkins, 578 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir.
2009); United States v. Jackson, 346 F.3d 22, 25 (2d Cir.2003) ( "[E]ven if each step in
the scheme was not elaborate, the total scheme was sophisticated in the way all the steps
were linked together .... ").
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Not every court has moved in this direction. The Fourth Circuit, for
example, recently admonished that the enhancement "does require more
than just thoughtful or potentially successful planning" and overturned a
lower court's application of the enhancement in a bank fraud case."'
Among other things, the appellate court did not agree that forgeries and
the use of a stolen identity evinced sufficient sophistication.5 2 But this
case suggests only that the enhancement, much like the MMP
enhancement that preceded it, is likely to become the subject of
inconsistent opinions and substantial litigation. Indeed, an earlier Fourth
Circuit opinion, which affirmed application of the enhancement, cited
familiar facts such as the duration of the defendant's scheme and the
nature and extent of his lies to his victims. 3 Certainly, there exists no
reason for prosecutors not to seek the enhancement whenever they can.
The enhancement is so case-specific it is doubtful that any one court
opinion will curtail its future application.
Oddly enough, the enhancement's tax evasion twin has not enjoyed
the same statistical increase in popularity; this may be because courts
already applied it more often in 2005, or because the enhancement in
Section 2T 1.1 applies to a much narrower category of criminal conduct. 4
Nevertheless, courts appear to interpret the tax-related enhancement as
expansively as they interpret the enhancement under Section 2B 1.1.5
To the extent courts are either explicitly or implicitly interpreting
sophistication to mean "more than usual planning," they risk
transforming the enhancement into a newer version of the "more than
minimal planning" adjustment. Had the Commission desired to transform
"more than minimal planning" into "more than usual planning," it easily
could have done so. Instead, the Commission eliminated MMP and
effectively incorporated the concept of planning into the fraud loss tables
51. United States v. Adepoju, 756 F.3d 250, 259 (4th Cir. 2014) (deciding that the use
of forged checks and stolen identity to commit bank fraud was an insufficient basis for
application of enhancement in a bank fraud case).
52. Id.
53. United States v. Shmuckler, 533 F. App'x 287, 289-90 (4th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 963 (2014) ("[The defendant] similarly attracted clients with lies,
including falsehoods regarding the success rate of his business, his status as an attorney,
and the extent of [his company's] operations. He also took significant steps to conceal his
fraud by telling clients not to communicate with their lenders.").
54. In 2013, 14.3% of the 628 offenders sentenced under Section 2TI. 1 received the
enhancement for sophisticated means under Section 2Tl.l(b)(2), whereas in 2005, that
figure was 14.1%. See Guideline Application Frequencies, supra note 37.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 711 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2013)
(deciding that the use of a bank account with a "deceptive name" to hide income was
sufficient to justify the enhancement's application in a tax fraud case).
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back in 2001.56 Moreover, as MMP's critics pointed out years ago, an
enhancement that applies to nearly all cases does not make for a very
good sorting device.
5 7
Of course, it may be that the sophisticated means enhancement's
incidence will soon level off or that the fraud offender population has so
changed in recent years that circumstances actually warrant an across the
board, two-level increase. I consider these points more fully in Part IV.
IV. EVALUATING THE ENHANCEMENT'S POPULARITY
As discussed in Part III, even a casual observer can discern from a
review of both court cases and Sentencing Commission data the
sophisticated means enhancement's growing popularity. Given the
manner in which courts have interpreted the enhancement, there is no
reason to believe this increase will abate.
Although the Guidelines are themselves advisory, they nevertheless
set an anchoring point for sentencing judges, 58 even though judges have
been fairly willing to sentence below those anchoring points in fraud
cases. 59 Thus, the enhancement imposes costs on defendants, including
those who successfully argue for variances from their recommended
sentencing ranges.
For many defendants, the inclusion of the enhancement translates
into an imprisonment increase of about six months, all else being equal.
60
For extremely low-loss offenses, the inclusion translates into an offense
level floor of twelve and the increased likelihood that the offender's
56. See Bowman, The 2001 Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms, supra note 15, at
30 (explaining that "the new guideline builds the [MMP's] two levels into its loss table
beginning with cases in which the loss exceeds $120,000").
57. Bowman, supra note 19, at 499.
58. Peugh v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013) ("The post-Booker federal
sentencing scheme aims to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are
anchored by the Guidelines and that they remain a meaningful benchmark through the
process of appellate review."); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) ("[A] district
judge must give serious consideration to the extent of any departure from the Guidelines
and must explain his conclusion that an unusually lenient or an unusually harsh sentence
is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient justifications .... ).
59. For a discussion on sentencing departures in fraud cases, see Frank 0. Bowman,
III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
51 Hous. L. REv. 1227, 1251-52 (2013) [hereinafter Bowman, Dead Law Walking].
60. Under the Sentencing Guidelines' Sentencing Table, a two-level increase for a
first-time offender with an offense level of 15 would result in an additional six months'
imprisonment added to his recommended sentencing range. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table, (2013), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2013/2013-5asentab.
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sentence will include a term of imprisonment.6 For high-loss offenders,
as well as recidivists, the enhancement can result in substantially greater
terms of imprisonment, with increases of twenty or even thirty months.62
Thus, the enhancement, as it grows in popularity, imposes a
moderate additional punishment on numerous criminals who commit
fraud offenses. The normative component of this increase hinges largely
on two factors: (a) the purported reason for punishing "sophistication" in
the first place; and (b) the explanation for the enhancement's rise in
popularity over the past decade. The next two sections consider both of
these issues in turn.
A. The Justifications for Punishing Sophistication
Although multiple justifications for punishment exist, most of those
can be classified under the standard categories of "desert" and
"deterrence." 63 Desert-oriented theories focus on the offender's moral
culpability and whether it is proper or necessary that society condemn his
actions.64 Deterrence theory, by contrast, is grounded in utilitarian cost-
benefit analysis, wherein policymakers attempt to dissuade rational
offenders from engaging in harm by manipulating variables such as the
offender's sentence and the probability that he will be detected and
punished.65
61. See id. (noting that offense level 12 translates into Zone C offense recommending
10-16 months' imprisonment).
62. An offense level of 24 matched with a Criminal History Category I (e.g., a first-
time offender) yields a recommended sentence range 51-63 months. At level 26, the
range increases to 63-78 months. Thus, the enhancement increases the high-level
offender's recommended sentence by a year. The effect is magnified the greater one's
offense level or criminal history category. See id.
63. See Michael Cahill, Politics and Punishment: Reactions to Markel's Political
Rebtributivism, I VA. J. CRIM. L. 167, 168 (2012) ("As is well known, there are thought
to be two standard so-called 'theories of punishment,' each of which gives a different
answer to the question of when and whom to punish..." (citing retributive and utilitarian
justifications for punishment)); Paul Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment
Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1090-91 (2011)
(contrasting rival theories of "desert" and "deterrence").
64. For a discussion of retributive theory's different forms, see Michael Cahill,
Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 825-36 (2007).
65. For several of the most cited accounts, see generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (setting forth general
concept that criminal deterrence is a function of probability of detection and sanctions);
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-
Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (explaining how criminal law's sanctions can shape
personal preferences).
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Most arguments in support of the sophisticated means enhancement
draw on these rival theories. Thus, the enhancement is warranted because
sophistication serves as a proxy for low probability of detection and
correspondingly low deterrence or because it evinces a particularly
culpable state of mind and therefore makes the offender more deserving
of harsher punishment. I briefly address each of these below.
1. Sophistication as a Proxy for Probability of Detection
An enhancement for sophistication in either the execution or
concealment of an offense reflects concerns that sophistication reduces
the probability that law enforcement authorities will detect and
successfully prosecute offenders. 66 In order to better deter would-be
criminals, law enforcement authorities must match a higher sanction with
a lower-visibility offense. This argument is well illustrated by the
extraterritorial and multijurisdictional enhancements that are contained in
the same section as the sophisticated means enhancement.67
Deterrence theory presumes that criminals perceive the expected cost
of punishment as a function of the prescribed sanction and its likelihood
of occurrence.68 Further scholarship recognizes that criminals discount
sanctions slated to begin in later time periods. 69 If criminals discount the
gap between engaging in crime and being punished for it, as Well as the
additional future months added onto a sanction, sanctions eventually lose
their marginal deterrent effect. The same is true for criminals whose
disutility of imprisonment decreases after an initial period.70 Under any
of these scenarios, extending an already substantial sanction produces
66. Similar arguments have been made for imposing punitive damages in cases where
individuals have attempted to conceal their harmful conduct. See A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, Ill HARV. L. REV. 869, 908
(conceding that courts might use evidence of concealment "to aid in the determination of
the chance that the defendant might have escaped liability").
67. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.I cmt. Background (2014).
68. See generally Miriam. H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud,
94 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1302-10 (2008) (reviewing basic theory) [hereinafter Baer,
Deterrence of Corporate Fraud].
69. See, e.g., Yair Listokin, Crime and (with a Lag) Punishment: The Implications of
Discounting for Equitable Sentencing, 44 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 115, 116 (2007).
70. Baer, supra note 68, at 1305 ("Discounts affect criminal sentences in two ways.
First, they erode the disutility of additional penalties. Second, they reduce the overall
disutility of sentences meted out after a long delay."). For the technical treatment of
discounts and declining utility of imprisonment, and their collective effect on deterrence
efforts, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shaveil, On the Disutility and Discounting of
Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-7 (1999). See
generally Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a
Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232 (1985).
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less additional deterrence than increasing the offender's probability of
detection.
Sometimes, increasing the probability of detection is impossible, as
enforcement budgets reach their limit.71 Accordingly, it might make
sense for the fraud guideline, or the Guidelines in general, to include a
provision that recognizes truly "difficult to detect" offenses.7 2 To some
degree, the obstruction of justice adjustment located in Chapter 3 of the
Guidelines performs this function.73 But the obstruction enhancement
applies only to offenders who "willfully" obstruct or impede the
administration of justice.74 The obstruction enhancement does not apply
to fraud offenders completely unaware of any ongoing law enforcement
investigation, much less to offenders whose conduct has yet to trigger
any investigation. 75 The issue arises when offenders purposely construct
their frauds in a manner so that they will be particularly difficult to
detect. Prosecutors desiring to punish these offenders must therefore seek
refuge in some other part of the Guidelines.
Judge Posner articulated the detection justification in United States v.
Kontny, a 2001 tax case in which the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court's application of the sophisticated means enhancement under
Section 2T1 .1.76 As Judge Posner explained, "The more sophisticated the
efforts that an offender employs to conceal his offense, the less likely he
is to be detected, and so he should be given a heavier sentence to
maintain the same expected punishment, and hence the same
",77deterrence ....
Since the Guidelines already presume some degree of concealment
(fraud, after all, depends upon the deception of others), as well as an
adjustment for obstructive conduct,78 a separate enhancement for
sophistication presumes that the offender's conduct was more difficult to
detect than some "average" fraud crime. 79 Thus, were courts to punish
sophistication in a disciplined and fair manner, one would expect them to
set some agreed upon "baseline" for "ordinary fraud" and then determine
71. See generally Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1491, 1510 (2008) (describing factors that affect the government's decision to continue
pursuing offenders).
72. It could also purposely use capacious language to define terms such as "fraud."
Id. at 1563-64 (2008).
73. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C.1 (2014).
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. United States v. Kontny, 238 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2001).
77. Id. at 820.
78. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2014).
79. See Kontny, 238 F.3d at 820-21.
20151
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
which cases go beyond that baseline in terms of likelihood of detection.
In theory this sounds plausible; in practice, however, it is made ever
more difficult by the fraud guideline's application to a multitude of
economic crimes whose similarity begins and ends with an offender's
use of deceit. Surely courts can (and do) compare the case in question to
a similar type of offense (i.e., tax evasion), but the process of choosing a
proper baseline for a multitude of schemes is an invitation for courts to
develop wildly different estimates of how detectible a given crime is and
what the relevant baseline should be.
In Kontny, for example, a husband and wife attempted to conceal
their business income by paying their employees a portion of their
salaries off the books.80 Their methodology was fairly straightforward:
They wrote separate checks to the employees, one for regular wages
and one for overtime, and sometimes the overtime checks would
include reimbursement for expense items to disguise the fact that the
checks were for wages. The Kontnys programmed their computer so
that the amount of the overtime checks was classified in nonwage
expense categories. The stubs for the overtime checks, which they
gave their accountant, likewise placed the expense in nonwage
81categories.
As the foregoing description conveys, the only evidence of
"sophistication" in Kontny was that the defendants used a computer to
help keep track of their off-the-book payments. 82 Judge Posner conceded
that the Kontnys were hardly "sophisticated" in the "lay sense";
83
nevertheless, Judge Posner concluded that their conduct exhibited greater
expertise than the simple shopkeeper who tallies up his receipts for the
day and places some of the cash in a shoebox under his bed in order to
evade taxes.84
Thus, in Kontny, the shoebox became the baseline against which all
other tax frauds were judged. Not surprisingly, the defendants argued
that such a baseline would render nearly all federal tax defendants
eligible for the enhancement.85 This argument, however, did not concern
80. Id. at 816.
81. Id. at 820.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id. ("The Kontnys' efforts at concealment were sophisticated in relation to a case
in which the owner of a shop evades taxes by emptying the drawer of the cash register
before counting the day's cash receipts and puts the cash thus skimmed into a shoebox
and slides it under his bed ... .
85. Id. at 821.
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the Seventh Circuit.86 At the time the Guidelines were adopted in 1987,
Judge Posner explained, the cases prosecuted included a mix of simpler
tax cases.87 Thus, it was reasonable to assume that the Commission
intended the courts to apply the enhancement to the non-simple cases,
even if those non-simple cases expanded to occupy most of the court's
docket.88 The fact that the government had changed its charging practices
in the intervening years did not alter the Commission's definition of
sophisticated. 89
Whatever the merits of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning as applied to
tax cases may be, it is difficult to believe that the Commission would be
satisfied were courts to apply the sophisticated means enhancement
across the board to all or nearly all fraud offenders (or those who choose
to use implements other than the proverbial shoebox). Nor is it likely that
the Commission would set 1987 as the benchmark from which to judge
sophistication. Since the promulgation of the Guidelines in 1987, the
Sentencing Commission has repeatedly revised both the fraud guideline's
core loss table and the various enhancements applicable to specific
offense conduct.90 Accordingly, assuming an equivalent loss amount, the
"average fraud" of many years ago now triggers a much harsher
punishment long before one takes into account the sophistication of the
offense. 91
Moreover, to the extent federally charged fraud offenders have
indeed become more sophisticated, it is likely because of technological
improvements in communications and computers. If one adopts as one's
benchmark the simple shopkeeper who hides money underneath his
mattress, then the term "sophistication" means something akin to "uses a
computer or similar technology," which in today's world means very
little.
A final point is in order: Although technology greatly enhances a
fraud offender's ability to harm and deceive others, it also exposes the
86. Id.
87. Id. 821-22.
88. See infra note 89.
89. Kontny, 238 F.3d at 822 ("[Tjoday the average criminal tax fraud that is
prosecuted is more sophisticated than when the concept of sophistication was introduced
into the guidelines. That is no reason for thinking the Commission would consider the
enhancement imposed in this or like cases excessive even if they are the only type of
criminal tax fraud being prosecuted nowadays.").
90. "The sentences prescribed by the Guidelines have increased steadily and
repeatedly since 1987 for all classes of economic offenders." Frank 0. Bowman III,
Sentencing High-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds After Booker, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 167,
168 (2008) (charting offense level and sentencing range increases for hypothetical
offenders) [hereinafter Bowman, High-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds].
91. Id.
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offender to possible detection. The cash a fraudster hides in his
shoeboxes and mattresses, for example, is far more difficult to detect
than a series of suspicious bank transactions, which are the subject of
reporting obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act. 92 The fraud conducted
over a smartphone is vastly more traceable and provable than the fraud
conducted over a series of face-to-face conversations.
In sum, digital technology aids criminals, but it also aids victims,
police departments, and government agents. Computers and the Internet
aid prospective victims in avoiding possible scams and enhance the
investigative abilities of police and federal agents. A federal statute
requires telecommunication companies to aid the government in its law
enforcement activities.93 Just how much technology aids offenders or law
enforcement agencies is the subject of a different and far more involved
discussion. 94 For now, it is sufficient to point out that technology's effect
on criminals and those who pursue them is likely ambiguous. The
detection justification for the sophisticated means enhancement therefore
takes us only so far.
2. Sophistication as Enhanced Moral Culpability
A distinct reason for sentencing sophisticated offenses more harshly
is that sophistication evinces greater moral culpability than purely
opportunistic, spur-of-the-moment fraud. 95 As others have pointed out,
92. The Bank Secrecy Act compels financial institutions to file suspicious activity
reports with the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
("FinCen"), and provides criminal and civil penalties for institutions that fail to do so. See
31 U.S.C.A. § 5318 (g) (West 2014) (requiring notification).
93. The Communications for Assistance in Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), was
enacted in 1994 and requires telecommunication companies to assist in electronic
surveillance. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1010 (1994). For an in depth discussion of CALEA's
history and the FBI's attempt to expand the Act in light of newer and more sophisticated
technology, see generally Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark, & Susan
Landau, Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping on the Internet,
12 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2014).
94. Professor Orin Kerr has persuasively argued that much of Fourth Amendment
doctrine can be understood as an adjustment tool whereby the Fourth Amendment
expands or contracts to maintain some type of equilibrium in power between criminals
and law enforcement personnel as technological advances aid one or the other group. See
Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REv. 476 (2011). As Professor Kerr's article demonstrates, evolving technology has
played a role in aiding both criminals and the law enforcers who pursue them: "Change
alters how people try to commit crimes and how the police try to catch them." Id. at 486.
95. For a more in-depth treatment of the difference between planned misconduct and
temptation-driven misbehavior and its implications for the corporate workplace, see
Miriam H. Baer, Confronting the Two Faces of Corporate Fraud, 66 FLA. L. REv. 87,
115-25 (2014) [hereinafter Baer, Confronting the Two Faces of Corporate Fraud].
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although fraud offenses are often described as "specific intent" offenses,
the intent to deceive serves as an all-purpose mental state; it covers
everything from the momentary lapse to the well-planned and
meticulously executed scheme. 96 Notwithstanding federal criminal law's
treatment of momentary lapses and premeditated frauds as equivalents,
most of us intuit a difference between the temptation-driven, impulsive
offender and the diabolical, cold-blooded one. This intuition drives the
statutory distinctions in state homicide statutes between simple
"intentional" murder and "willful and premeditated" murder. 97 The
intentional killer becomes angry during an argument and kills his victim
with a nearby gun; the premeditated murderer lies in wait and poisons his
prey.98
Federal crimes do not parse mental states or offense conduct the way
state statutes do.99 As Professor Frank Bowman has observed, "A
peculiar feature of American property crimes generally and federal fraud
crimes in particular is that, unlike crimes against persons, statutory law
does not rank the severity of offenses according to differences in the
mental states of defendants."' 0' If there is any parsing to be done, it takes
place at the moment of sentencing. Courts sometimes care whether an
intention to commit fraud was formed "in the moment" or over a long
96. Bowman, supra note 90, at 171 ("Neither federal statutes nor the Guidelines rank
mental states as more or less serious or attempt to correlate them with degrees of
punishment.").
97. See generally Michael Zydney Manheimer, Not the Crime but the Cover-Up: A
Deterrence-Based Rationale for the Premeditation-Deliberation Formula, 86 IND. L.J.
879 (2011) (discussing the rationale for creating a distinction between intentional
murders with premeditation and deliberation, and intentional murders without
premeditation and deliberation).
98. None of this is to say that these distinctions hold up well when applied to the
multitude of cases that fall between extreme prototypes. For a critique of the
premeditation doctrine in theory and practice, see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Plotting
Premeditation's Demise, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 84-85 (2012) (articulating
normative and conceptual problems posed by doctrine), and Larry Alexander and
Kimberly Ferzan, Culpable Acts of Risk Creation, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 375, 400-01
(2008) (demonstrating ways in which "premeditation" doctrine is both under and over-
inclusive).
99. As a result, there is no "grading" of culpability in federal white-collar criminal
law: "The classic white collar crimes-bank fraud, mail fraud and wire fraud-are not
predicated on lower level crimes with a lesser degree of culpability or extenuating
circumstances. The individual is either guilty or not guilty of the designated offense."
Ellen Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
731, 757 (2007).
100. Bowman, supra note 90, at 171.
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period of time, 01 but federal fraud statutes bundle all purposive conduct
into a single category.
If one of the Guidelines' purposes is to "distingui[sh] between more
and less culpable defendants,"' 0 2 then an enhancement that punishes
premeditation more harshly is both justifiable and desirable.'03 Society
can justly decide to condemn more harshly premeditated actions over
those purposive actions that materialize in a matter of seconds. 1°4 The
concession that premeditation matters, however, still fails to answer
several questions. First, it fails to identify the conduct that demonstrates
"premeditation" and is therefore deserving of greater punishment. This
difficulty has plagued state courts and legislatures who have labored
mightily to identify language sufficient to distinguish "intentional"
murders from "premeditated" ones. 105
Beyond the conceptual problem of defining "premeditation,"
however, is the question of whether "sophistication" can serve as its
proxy. When it comes to homicide, one can imagine fairly simple
planning (mixing together a relatively common poison, waiting outside
someone's home to shoot him, strangling someone in her sleep) that is,
nevertheless, premeditated. The same is likely true in the fraud context.
Many of the factors that courts cite as evidence of "sophistication" may
in fact be evidence of premeditation. But if that is the case, why are we
so sure that the current loss table does not already reflect such
forethought?
B. Three Possible Reasons for the Increase
The previous section offered two possible reasons for punishing
"sophistication." Of the two, the moral culpability claim is more
defensible, despite sophistication's limitations as a reliable proxy.
101. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 95, at 98 n.40 (citing United States v. Adelson, 441 F.
Supp. 2d 506, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
102. Bowman, supra note 90, at 168.
103. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Act, Agency and Indifference: The Foundations of
Criminal Responsibility, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 441, 448 (2009) (reviewing VICTOR
TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (2005)) ("The best understanding of why
retributivists could believe that premeditated killings are more culpable than other
intended killings is that premeditated killings are the absolute expressions of our agency.
These are the acts that the killer not only intends but also plans, coolly and calmly.").
104. "The conclusion that the criminal law might not influence the behavior of many
murderers provides no justification for failing to treat with maximum seriousness those
offenders who had an opportunity to reflect upon what they were doing and chose to do it
anyway." Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375, 384 (1994)
(articulating the retributive argument for punishing premeditated killings more harshly).
105. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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With the moral culpability defense in mind, the remainder of this
Part sketches three possible explanations for the rapid increase in the
enhancement's popularity: (a) criminals, in general, have become more
sophisticated; (b) federal prosecutors have changed their charging
practices to focus more intently on sophisticated fraud offenses; and (c)
prosecutors, probation officers, and judges have, over time, become more
comfortable seeking and applying the enhancement.
1. Fraud Offenders Have Become More Sophisticated
If fraud offenders have, en masse, become more sophisticated, then
the enhancement's increasing prevalence is defensible. It still may not be
desirable, because if all fraud offenders have, over the past decade,
become more dangerous and more morally culpable, the proper response
might be to alter the loss table once again, as the Commission has done
throughout the years.
Whether fraud offenders are more sophisticated than they were ten
years ago is an empirical question meriting its own extended analysis. If
the "analysis" however, is simply that fraud offenders more often use
technology to carry out their offenses today than before, the argument
fails, particularly under the culpability-based justification for punishing
sophistication. Recall: one of the core justifications for punishing
sophistication is that sophistication serves as a proxy for premeditation 10
6
and therefore demonstrates enhanced moral culpability. Technology-
particularly cheap and prevalent technology-severs the connection
between sophistication and premeditation. If one can commit a fraud
through the mere press of a button (or swipe of an iPhone screen), then
fraud very much resembles the temptation-prone, opportunistic behavior
of yesteryear. Accordingly, as technology becomes cheaper and more
available to the masses, the link between sophistication and culpability
weakens, and the enhancement therefore becomes less useful in sorting
the worst offenders from the rest of the pack.
Finally, one might point to the conduct that led to the mortgage
meltdown and corresponding financial crisis 10 7 as evidence of increased
sophistication among those who commit fraud. But few of the
individuals who marketed or created these securities were even charged
106. See supra Part IV.A.2.
107. See generally Steve Denning, Lest We Forget: Why We Had a Financial Crisis,
FORBES (Nov. 22, 2011, 11:28 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/22/5086/ (giving an overview of why
the 2008 mortgage and financial crisis occurred).
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with fraud, and even fewer (some would say just one'08) were convicted
in connection with such behavior. 10 9 Thus, the sophistication of this
uncharged group of individuals could not possibly justify the application
of the enhancement to individuals who engaged in far simpler (if easier
to prove) behavior.
2. Prosecutors Have Charged More Sophisticated Fraud Offenses
A second explanation for the increased application of the
enhancement is that the population of offenders charged with federal
fraud crimes has changed over the past decade. Under this reasoning, the
criminal population has remained constant while federal prosecutors
charge more sophisticated cases. This explanation more or less maps the
government's argument in the Kontny case."10
As is the case with changes in the overall criminal population, the
federal government's charging practices is a subject that merits its own
extended treatment. Nevertheless, portions of the Sentencing
Commission's data do suggest a shift in the types of fraud cases that
prosecutors charge. Over the past decade, prosecutors have charged
fewer minor fraud cases."' For example, prosecutions of extremely low-
loss fraud cases ($5,000 loss or less) that were sentenced under Section
2B 1.1 have steadily dropped, as demonstrated by Table 2:
108. See Todd Haugh, The Most Senior Wall Street Official: Evaluating the State of
Financial Crime Prosecutions, 9 VA. LAW & Bus. REV. 153 (2015) (dismissing Kareem
Serageldin's prosecution as a "mundane white collar crime marginally related" to the
financial crisis).
109. For criticisms and responses regarding the government's failure to prosecute Wall
Street executives in connection with the financial crisis, see Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, The
Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/an/09/financial-
crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ (offering reasons why federal prosecutors have
focused more on insider trading offenses than possible mortgage fraud claims); Daniel C.
Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 265, 265 (2014) (advising
that "a focus on headhunting will only distract from, and reduce the pressure for, efforts
to explain [the collapse] and prevent its occurrence").
110. See supra notes 76-89.
111. See infra Table 2.
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Table 2: Extremely Low Loss Frauds (Less than $5,000)
Percentage Charged,
Date 2B1.1(b)(1)(A)" 2
2006 24.8113
2007 23.6
2008 22.0
2009 20.4
2010 19.2
2011 17.5
2012 15.0
2013 14.7
The fact that federal prosecutors' offices have substantially reduced
their share of minor fraud cases suggests either an overall preference for
more serious cases, or at least for cases that translate into higher
Guideline offense levels and corresponding prison sentences. Extremely
low-loss frauds do not likely feature much repetition or exist for a long
period of time. Nor do they likely involve much planning or investments
in sophisticated technology to carry out the offense since the payoff in
most cases is so small.
112. Information in Table 2 is taken from the Sentencing Commission's Guidelines
Application Frequencies reports, Use of Guidelines and Specific Offense Characteristics
- Guideline Calculation Based Fiscal Year for each fiscal year from 2006-2013, Use of
Guidelines and Specific Offense Characteristics - Guideline Calculation Based Fiscal
Year, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/federal-
sentencing-statistics/guideline-application-frequencies (last visited May 25, 2015)
[hereinafter GUIDELINE APPLICATION FREQUENCIES].
113. In 2006, an additional 720 offenders were sentenced under Section 2F1.1; all of
these offenses involved an actual or intended loss in excess of at least $5,000. See id. at
Fiscal Year 2006, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/guideline-application-
frequencies/2006/O6_glinexgline.pdf (last visited May 25, 2015). Thus, the combined
group of low-loss frauds sentenced under Section 2B 1. 1 and 2F 1. 1 forms a slightly less
percentage of the entire group-22.2%.
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Where the sophisticated means enhancement was reserved solely for
a small subset of "especially" intricate or complex conduct, the shift
away from extremely low loss frauds would make little difference in the
enhancement's prevalence if, in fact, a prosecutor substituted a garden
variety moderate-loss fraud for the very minor one. 1 4 If, however, one
defines "sophisticated" as encompassing frauds of several years'
duration; that use "repetitive and coordinated" conduct; and employ the
use of computers, forgeries, or fraudulent documents, then the shift from
minor frauds to even moderate-loss ones becomes quite significant.
Indeed, as the government shifts its efforts in the direction of moderate
and high-loss frauds, most cases may easily fall under the sophisticated
category. The schemes that fail to garner this appellation may not be
conceptually different from the rest of the pool, but instead enjoy the
moral luck of having been intercepted early enough in the scheme before
the offender has had a chance to engage in repetitive and coordinated
conduct. 5
3. Sentencing Creep: Getting Used to the Sophisticated Means
Enhancement
The final explanation for the increase in the enhancement's incidence
is what one might call sentencing creep. Over time, and in response to
various precedents, the various participants within the federal criminal
justice system have grown comfortable with a broader definition and
application of the enhancement than they may have originally intended.
The change is so incremental and gradual that the players themselves are
unaware of it.
116
Sentencing creep entails more than a district court's inadvertent
expansion of sentencing law through vague or ill-considered language.
Rather, the concept describes a phenomenon whereby all of the various
114. As Professor Bowman points out, between 2003-2012, the median loss amount
for fraud cases shifted upward from $18,414 to $95,408. Bowman, supra note 59, at
1254.
115. A sentencing regime that sentences on the basis of moral luck "hold[s] an actor
responsible for events beyond his control." Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and
the Persistence of Strict Liability, 62 DuKE L. J. 285, 338 (2012) (citing state guideline
systems that "adjust sentences based on results and circumstances without regard to a
defendant's intent or awareness").
116. Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise
Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 Wis. L. REv. 495, 511 (2012) ("People are fairly
adept at perceiving change when the cues are salient enough, but poor when change is
slow and gradual. This is especially true when we are busy, cognitively engaged (if not
overloaded) in tasks that employ scripts and schemas to make sense of situations that are
largely continuous.").
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players in the criminal justice system successively transform a so-called
narrowly tailored enhancement into a more broadly applied one through
a series of iterative, incremental moves. Prosecutors seek it in plea
negotiations and at contested sentencing hearings; defense attorneys
more often expect it and perhaps accede to it in some negotiations;
probation officers more often include it in their pre-sentence reports; and
finally, judges more often apply it. Gradually, and over time, a
mechanism meant to sort the worst from the merely bad instead becomes
a six to eighteen month add-on in prison time for nearly everyone.
V. SOLUTIONS TO A POSSIBLE PROBLEM
The sophisticated means enhancement for fraud offenses has steadily
grown in popularity throughout the past decade. It is unclear whether this
growth can be attributed solely to sentencing creep or also to federal
charging practices. The data reflects a drop in extremely minor cases, but
the sophisticated means enhancement ostensibly applies only to
particularly sophisticated offenses. Assuming prosecutors were replacing
extremely minor cases with relatively moderate ones, their actions should
have had little effect on the enhancement's prevalence.
Whatever the explanation for the enhancement's rise in popularity, it
seems unlikely that this increase will abate any time soon. On April 9,
2015, following hearings and consideration of comments, the Sentencing
Commission adopted its amendment to Section 2131.1, which included a
narrowing of the sophisticated means enhancement to only those cases in
which the defendant's specific conduct was sophisticated. 1 7 Previously,
the enhancement would have applied so long as the "offense" involved
sophisticated means." 18 Now, the prosecution must draw a specific link
between the enhancement and defendant's conduct. Perhaps this will
reduce the enhancement's popularity because the amendment reduces the
likelihood that a low-level defendant charged in an otherwise
sophisticated conspiracy will be unnecessarily saddled with a two-point
enhancement. Then again, there is no indication that the unsophisticated
coconspirator has been responsible for the enhancement's three-fold rise.
117. Preliminary amendments to the Guidelines, which will become final when
published in the Federal Register, are available at:
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-
amendments/20150409_PRELIMRFAmendments.pdf at 65. See also Press Release,
U.S. Sentencing Commission Adopts Economic Crime Guideline Amendments, Apr. 9,
2015, available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-
news-advisories/press-releases/20150409_PressRelease.pdf.
118. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1. 1 (b)(l 0) (2014).
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More importantly, so long as courts continue to apply the
enhancement expansively to a broad range of conduct, the requirement
that the defendant's specific conduct be sophisticated is not likely to
derail the enhancement's application. The Sixth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Crosgrove 19 illuminates the problem. The defendant in a
fraudulent insurance conspiracy appealed the lower court's application of
the enhancement, in part, because he had played no role in the setting up
of fictitious shell entities. 1 20 This fact did not concern the Sixth Circuit in
light of his other "sophisticated" conduct:
Crosgrove's argument that he did not participate in the creation of
shells or otherwise participate in offshore activities is therefore
irrelevant unless he can also refute the finding that the use of a
pseudonym and the issuance of fraudulent insurance certificates is
not an appropriate basis for a sophisticated-means enhancement.
12
'
If the use of a pseudonym and the creation of false certificates in an
insurance fraud scheme trigger the enhancement's application, one
cannot help but wonder if the Commission's latest efforts to clarify the
enhancement's scope will fall on deaf ears.
Other than the above tweak regarding co-conspirators, the
Commission's amendment did not address the additional concerns raised
in this Essay. The Commission initially proposed tightening the
Application Note to direct courts to compare the present crime to
"typical offenses of the same kind," and had further proposed the
deletion of the multi-jurisdictional telemarketing example critiqued
earlier in this Essay.122 The Department of Justice, however, objected to
these and other proposed changes and ultimately, the Commission left
the Application Note and obsolete telemarketing example intact. 123Thus,
119. 637 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2011).
120. Id. at 650.
121. Id. at667
122. The proposed language would have defined sophisticated means as "especially
complex or especially intricate offense conduct that displays a significantly greater level
of planning or employs significantly more advanced methods in executing or concealing
the offense than a typical offense of the same kind." U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, January
2015 Proposed Amendments to Section 2Bl.l(b)(10), Application Note 9(B), at 82,
available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-
friendly-amendments/2015014-RFP-Amendments.pdf (last visited May 25, 2015)
(emphasis added). In addition, the proposed amendment further provided, "Conduct that
is common to offenses of the same kind ordinarily does not constitute sophisticated
means." Id.
123. See Letter submitted by Jonathan J. Wroblewsi, Director, Office of Policy and
Legislation, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, March 9, 2015, available at
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there is no reason to assume that the enhancement's incidence will drop
substantially in future years. To the contrary, assuming courts continue to
interpret the enhancement expansively, it is quite possible that in another
decade or so, the Commission will find itself confronting the same
problem it encountered with MMP enhancements years ago. Assuming
that day of reckoning occurs, how might the Commission respond?
One possibility is to do nothing beyond monitoring the enhancement
more carefully and watching to see if its application crosses some
predefined threshold. Presumably, this monitoring exercise would also
include the sophisticated means enhancement contained in the tax
guideline, Section 2Tl.l(b)(2). 12 4 This monitoring approach, although
conservative and unlikely to waste any time or political capital, is
distasteful insofar as one believes the enhancement is no longer doing the
job the Commission intended it to do. Moreover, it raises the question as
to what the threshold ought to be.
A second option is to keep the language in the enhancement intact,
but for the Commission to revise its efforts to change the commentary
and application notes relating to the enhancement. The Commission
could, as it already tried to, update the examples it uses to demonstrate
sophistication. It might also state that the mere use of digital or computer
technology-as well as innovations made readily available by digital
technology, such as altered invoices or forged signatures-does not
necessarily signify the "sophistication" warranting a two-level
enhancement. It could even make clear that conduct less sophisticated
than the conduct described in its application note should not justify an
enhancement. Unfortunately, these half-measures would likely spur more
litigation without necessarily clearing up, for litigants or courts, what the
Commission envisions for this particular enhancement. Moreover, any
movement in this direction would likely invoke strong objections from
the Department of Justice.
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-
meetings/20150312/DOJ.pdf.
124. In fiscal year 2013, 14.3% of offenders sentenced under Section 2T1.1 received
the enhancement. See Use of Guidelines and Specific Offense Characteristics Fiscal Year
2013, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/guideline-application-
frequencies/2013/Use of Guidelines andSpecificOffenseCharacteristicsGuideline_
CalculationBasedRevised.pdf (last visited May 25, 2015). In 2005, that number was
14.1%. See Use of Guidelines and Specific Offense Characteristics Fiscal Year 2005,
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/data-and-
statistics/federal-sentencing-statistics/guideline-application-
frequencies/2005/05_glinexgline.pdf (last visited May 25, 2015).
2015]
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
The Commission's remaining options are either to revise and retain
some version of the enhancement or eliminate it outright. Elimination
might be the easiest and cleanest move, were it not for Congress's 1998
statutory directive to include such an enhancement.125 Still, that statute
requires only that the Commission provide an "appropriate"
enhancement for frauds 126 that involve sophisticated means.127 Although
the Commission's discretion to interpret that term is not "unbounded," it
nevertheless maintains significant latitude to formulate language meeting
Congress' statutory directives. 128 Were the Commission to eliminate
Section 2B 1.1 (b)(1 0)(C) due to its increasing prevalence, extraterritorial
and multijurisdictional schemes would still continue to receive the two-
point enhancement (as originally intended by Congress), 129 as would
obstructive behavior under Section 3C1.1. Concerned sentencing courts
could impose additional upward variances on offenses that featured
particularly troubling facts but fell outside the above categories. But the
garden-variety "sophistication" that comes about through lying and
planning one's conduct over a period of months or years would no longer
result in a court or prosecutor needlessly tacking on another six to twelve
months' imprisonment; the punishment for such "sophistication" would
already be reflected in the fraud loss table, since planning often begets
greater and more certain loss.
Of course, the Commission could one day significantly overhaul the
economic fraud guideline in its entirety, which some commentators have
strongly urged. 130 Assuming it keeps the economic fraud guideline intact,
however, the Commission will likely find itself revisiting this issue. To
the extent sophistication (particularly the term as currently defined) is
already bound up in the calculation of intended or actual loss, the
enhancement does nothing more than extend most moderate and severe
fraud offenders' sentences. Even if one could support such an extension
125. See supra note 21.
126. See Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act of 1998 § 6(c)(2) (1998).
127. Of course, Congress could repeal or clarify that directive.
128. United States v. Hoyle, 751 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing United
States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)).
129. The Telemarketing Act's directive singled out the perpetration of frauds from
outside the United States as evidence of sophisticated means. See 112 Stat 521, § 6(c)(2),
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/01/15/act-pI 105-
184.pdf (last visited May 25, 2015).
130. The Commission had previously indicated its desire to study and revise the fraud
guideline. See supra note 3. In 2013, it held an Economic Crime Symposium in New
York at John Jay College to solicit feedback from a mix of jurists, practitioners and
academics. For a discussion of the Symposium, as well as more substantial reform
proposals, see Bowman, Dead Law Walking, supra note 59, at 1251 (describing
symposium and Commission's stated interest in possibly revising fraud guideline).
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as necessary and desirable, the proper way to increase sentences for any
crime is to do so transparently, following proper deliberation, and not in
the ad hoc manner that sentencing creep suggests.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Essay has focused on a single provision of the all-purpose fraud
guideline, Section 2B1.1. It suggests a reform that is fairly minimal
compared to the far more extensive changes that other organizations have
promoted regarding the sentencing of white-collar offenders.' 
31
Nevertheless, an in-depth analysis of a single enhancement is
instructive; among other things, it demonstrates the difficulty inherent in
sorting economic crime offenders for lesser and greater punishments.
Moreover, it illuminates the instability inherent in criminal sorting
devices. Between a state system whose statutes sort bad and worse
behavior up front, and a federal system that relies in large part on a
quasi-determinate sentencing scheme, the latter regime should be better
positioned to intervene when sorting devices lose their efficacy,
assuming politics does not get in the way of much needed reform.
Back when the Guidelines were first promulgated, the Commission
added an enhancement-more than minimal planning-in an attempt to
distinguish some types of fraud offenses from others. 32 By 1998,
observers concluded that this device had become ineffective and the
Commission retired it in 2001.33 Thirteen years later, another sorting
device may be losing its efficacy. Concededly, the sophisticated means
enhancement is still applied in fewer than 12% of all fraud cases, and it
may well be that its increasing popularity will level off. Nevertheless, a
survey of even a few court cases interpreting the enhancement implies
that it has come unmoored from its original meaning. If it was intended
for only the most intricate frauds, it is gradually turning into an
enhancement that will apply to all but the most simplistic. When the
Commission again revisits the question of white-collar sentencing, as it
131. For example, the American Bar Association's Task Force has proposed a far more
comprehensive and far-reaching type of reform for the sentencing of white-collar crimes.
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, A REPORT ON BEHALF OF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION TASK FORCE ON THE
REFORM OF FEDERAL SENTENCING FOR ECONOMIC CRIME (2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/crimina-justice/economic-c
rimes.authcheckdam.pdf (advocating a number of far-reaching reforms in how economic
crimes are sentenced);
132. See Steer, supra note 18, at 264 (describing Commission's early approach to
economic crimes in 1987, which "relied principally on the dollar loss and. . . 'more than
minimal planning' to measure offense seriousness").
133. See supra at Part I and notes 15-20.
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is sure to do, it would do well to reconsider the costs and benefits of this
relatively minor but vexatious enhancement.
